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This thesis examines the potential role of the Supreme Soviet
and its Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security
(KOGB) in the formation of Soviet defense policy. Important events
leading to the creation of the new Supreme Soviet and opening-
session debates on the appointment of the USSR Defense Minister and
release of students from service in the Armed Forces are reviewed.
The role of the KOGB in determining Soviet defense spending and
military reform are also examined. The thesis concludes with an
examination of the problems facing the KOGB, and points out that
significant military reform will likely emerge from the Supreme
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
The formation of Soviet defense policy has traditionally been
the purview of the highest levels of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) leadership with inputs from and coordination
with the military high command.* During the later Brezhnev era,
the military's influence, by virtue of its "near monopoly of
i
strategic planning and threat assessment," appeared to increase. 4
But as Stephen Foye points out, Mikhail Gorbachev's coming to power
and his policy of perestroika (restructuring or reconstruction)
"implied a diminution of the military establishment's long
sacrosanct position" in Soviet society. One of the effects of
Gorbachev's reform efforts has been to widen the playing field on
which the debate of Soviet defense policy occurs. This has occurred
on two levels. On one level, glasnost (openness) has permitted
increased discussion of the subject both in the general public and
academia. But on another more important level, fundamental change
* In this thesis the CPSU leadership includes primarily the
Politburo and, to a lesser degree, Central Committee Secretariat.
The military high command refers to the Ministry of Defense and
General Staff .
Jeffery Legro, Soviet Decision-Making and the Gorbachev
Reforms, Rand/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies, August 19, 1989, p.
5. (While Legro's analysis pertains to the military's influence in
crisis decision-making it is also true of the military's influence
in determining defense policy.)
Stephen Foye, "The Soviet Armed Forces in 1989," Report on
the USSR, January 26, 1989. p. 14.
in the formation of Soviet defense policy may result from the
demokratizatsia (democratization) of Soviet society; specifically
the formation of the new Supreme Soviet and its potential for
playing an increased role in the governing of the Soviet state and
determining defense policy.
This thesis examines the role (or possible role) of the
Supreme Soviet and its Committee for Questions of Defense and State
Security (Komitet po voprosam oborony gosudarstvennoy bezopanosti,
KOGB) in the development of Soviet defense policy. The author, not
a Russian linguist, draws primarily from English language
translations of Soviet press items and radio broadcasts for primary
sources. Secondary Western sources are used where they can help
clarify or shed light on matters. At a time of rapid socio-
political change in the Soviet Union, any studies of the subject
that endeavor to be "current" are often dated before publication.
For the same reason, projections about the future are at best risky
and built upon an ever-shifting foundation. Therefore examination
of the subject matter of this thesis is limited to the time period
from mid-1988 to early 1990.
Despite the "widening of the playing field," there is still
little concrete information on the Supreme Soviet's role in
developing defense policy. The workings of the Supreme Soviet's
Committee on Defense and State Security, many of whose meetings are
closed, remain nebulous if not secret. The degree of influence the
committee will be able to exert remains to be seen as it is only in
the formative stages of development while at the same time, the
entire Soviet political system is in a state of flux.
These difficulties not withstanding, the subject warrants
study because of its importance in the overall development of the
Soviet system. Citizens of western Liberal democracies
(specifically Americans) see little controversy in the notion of
legislative oversight of executive functions. Indeed, the system of
checks and balances is the very cornerstone of the U.S.
Constitution
.
But in the Soviet Union, Lenin's "vanguard party" has firmly
controlled the levers of government for over 70 years. The
Communist Party is at once executive, legislature, and judiciary,
usurping all government functions. One need not pass judgement upon
his ultimate goals to admit that Gorbachev, at the very least, has
significantly altered the political environment of the country to
the point where additional players have emerged. A skeletal
structure upon which to build a freer, more open, and more balanced
system has been erected. Whether or not the Soviet Union is able to
successfully build upon this is one of the critical political
developments of Soviet history, perhaps second in importance only
to the October Revolution of 1917.
The thesis opens with a brief review of the circumstances
surrounding the creation of the new Supreme Soviet and then traces
its involvement in defense policy during its first session through
two important debates. It then examines the workings of the course
of developments over the second and third sessions of the Supreme
Soviet. The composition of the Committee for Defense and State
Security is examined with the aim of trying to assess its impact on
defense policy formation. The thesis ends with an assessment of
the role the Supreme Soviet and its Commission on Defense and State
Security have played so far and its prospects for the future.
II. POLITICAL REFORM AND SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY
A. THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF POLITICAL REFORM
According to the 1977 Soviet constitution, the Supreme Soviet
is the "highest body of state authority" in the USSR. 5 But the
Supreme Soviet had never wielded real power, which was co-opted by
the CPSU, the "leading and guiding force of Soviet society and its
political system." This is particularly true of issues relating
to national defense despite the fact that the constitution outlines
several rights and duties of the Supreme Soviet in this area.
According to the constitution, Supreme Soviet deputies had the
right to "address inquiries to the Council of Ministers of the
USSR," and were entitled to a response in three days. Powers of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the smaller "standing body"
There have been several revisions to the 1977 "Brezhnev"
Constitution since the convening of the new Supreme Soviet. These
primarily deal with the functions of the legislative body and the
powers of the recently created Executive President. At the time of
the 19th Party Conference (at which this thesis begins) the 1977
Constitution was in force.
Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ,
Novosti Press Publishing House, 1987, p. 41. (For references on
Soviet state structure see, John A. Armstrong, Ideology, Politics ,
and Government in the Soviet Union, (Praeger Publishers: New York,
Washington, 1974), Donald D. Barry and Carol Barner-Barry
,
Contemporary Soviet Politics, (Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., 1978), The Soviet Political System: A Book of Readings, ed
.
Richard Cornell, (Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970),
Richard G. Wesson, The Soviet Russian State, (John Wiley & Sons,
Inc: New York, London, Sydney, Toronto, 1972).
Ibid., p. 10. (emphasis added)
7 Ibid.
, p. 44.
acting as the "highest body of state authority" between Supreme
Soviet sessions, included ratification of international treaties,
instituting and conferring mi 1 itary ranks, formation of the Defense
Council and appointment and dismissal of the high command of the
Armed Forces. The Supreme Soviet, or the Presidium acting in its
stead, did in fact accomplish all these tasks (though it is
doubtful any inquiries were directed to the Ministry of Defense),
but only after they had been predetermined at the highest levels of
the Party leadership. Since the Supreme Soviet only met briefly
twice a year, the Presidium carried out most of its duties. Also,
with the senior members of the Presidium, the Chairman and First
Vice-chairman, being senior party members (and of ten members of the
Politburo), Party control of this nominal legislature was assured.
This system of an omnipotent Party superseding the legislature
remained in effect through 1988.
By the middle of 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika was in
trouble. After a period of modest economic growth in late 1985 and
throughout 1986, Soviet economic performance reverted to the "years
of stagnation" that had come to mark the Brezhnev era. In fact,
as a result of increased shortages of basic goods and the confusion
caused by lurching attempts at economic reform, the Soviet consumer
was in many ways worse off in 1988 than before Gorbachev came to
power. Economic reform efforts faltered because of half-hearted
8 Ibid.
, pp. 45-46.
' "Party Approves Theses for 19th Conference," The Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, v. XL, June 22, 1988, p. 3.
measures repeatedly sabotaged by Party interference in economic
planning (despite calls for the separation of Party and state
functions), chronic transportation bottlenecks, and most
importantly, Soviet unwillingness to enact price reform due to
fears of "social unrest." Glasnost , originally intended by the
regime as a means of bringing pressure to bear on a stagnated
bureaucracy, misfired, fueling public resentment at leadership
failures to address mounting problems. It also became the
coalescing force around which restive nationalities agitated for
increased autonomy and, in some cases, absolute independence from
Moscow. The prestige, if not actual power of the CPSU, wilted as a
result of public acknowledgement of corruption and criticism.
Party frustrations and concerns over the pace and direction of
reform efforts were symbolized in the public dissensions of
conservative Politburo members Yegor K. Ligachev and Viktor M.
Chebrikov. In short, reform efforts were not keeping pace with the
deteriorating situation in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev realized
that if any of his reform efforts were to work, he would have to
ease the strangle hold of the Party while retaining its role as the
USSR's "leading and guiding force". This was a calculated gamble
that could (and indeed later would) start the Party down a
"slippery slope" towards possibly losing that role. But for a
recently converted Gorbachev, the facts of the matter were obvious;
*°
"Talk with Nikolai Ryzhkov, Economic Czar," Business Week,
June 5, 1989, p. 62.
political reform was the sine qua non for the success of
perestroika
.
B. CREATING THE NEW SUPREME SOVIET
At the 19th All Union Party Conference in late June 1988
Gorbachev outlined his plan for political reform. Central to this
effort was the creation of a "new" Supreme Soviet. This new Supreme
Soviet would be smaller (400-500 members) than its predecessor and
be elected by a new legislative body-the Congress of People's
Deputies. The new Supreme Soviet would be "a permanent supreme
body of power," would "discuss and resolve all legislative,
administrative and monitoring questions," and "direct the work of
the agencies accountable to it". Like the old Supreme Soviet,
the new body would be composed of two chambers-the Soviet of
Nationalities and Soviet of the Union. Among other issues, the
Soviet of the Union would concentrate on "strengthening the
country's defense capability". Gorbachev proposed the creation
of the post of "Chairman of the Supreme Soviet" with "broad state
authority" who, in addition to other duties, would "exercise
overall guidance" and "resolve key questions of foreign policy,
defense capability, and the country's security." The Presidium
11
"Gorbachev Report Sizes Up Restructuring," The Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, v. XL, July 27, 1988, p. 16.
12 Ibid.
When Gorbachev took on the powers of the new Executive
President in March 1990, these powers of "broad state authority"
moved from the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet to the President.
8
of the Supreme Soviet would be carried over from the old, though
its functions would be somewhat different. The Presidium would
consist of the Chairman (of the Supreme Soviet), two First Vice-
Chairmen, 15 Vice-chairmen (one per Union republic), the chairmen
of the two chambers, and the chairmen of standing and other
committees of the Supreme Soviet.
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet would "convene sessions,
coordinate the work of the committees ... and have certain
representative and other powers.
Gorbachev also envisioned "reinforcing the status" and
substantially expanding the powers of the committees in light of
their "new tasks." Committee members would be drawn from the
Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies.
Gorbachev intended that the government be responsive to the
Supreme Soviet and that the "government would reply to deputies'
questions and expand the practice of deputies inquiries."
Gorbachev's proposals caught many by surprise and appear to
have either been formulated at the last moment or kept secret until
the conference. The Central Committee theses, published a month
prior to the conference and supposedly the "starting point" for
discussions at the conference, dealt almost exclusively with
14





rejuvenating the local Soviets. 0 The theses did state that the
rejuvenation of the local Soviets presupposed "a cardinal increase
in the role of the country's supreme body of power," but merely
that various "options and proposals are possible here." However,
there was no mention of creating a new position of Chairman of the
Supreme Soviet, nor creating the new Congress of People's Deputies.
And, as Dawn Mann points out, the post-conference resolution on
democratization and political reform was a "very ambiguous,
incomplete document" that "glossed over" or failed to mention many
of Gorbachev's proposals. One of those not mentioned was the
post of Chairman indicating that some of the Party leadership did
not share the General Secretary's enthusiasm for the idea. Thus
Gorbachev's political reform proposals were greeted with
skepticism, if not apprehension, by his own party.
ib
"Conference Theses: The Way Ahead?" Soviet Analyst, v. 17,
June 15, 1988, p. 1.
19
"Party Approves Theses for 19th Conference," The Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, v. XL, June 22, 1988, p. 7.
Dawn Mann, "The Party Conference Resolution on
Democratization and Political Reform," Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Research Report, July 6, 1988, p. 1.
21 For a discussion of the effects of Gorbachev's reforms upon
Soviet national security, see Bruce Parrott, "Soviet National
Security Under Gorbachev," Problems of Communism, Nov-Dec 1988, pp.
1-36.
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III. THE BIRTH OF THE NEW SUPREME SOVIET
A. FROM THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES TO THE SUPREME SOVIET
The new Congress of People's Deputies' primary responsibility
was the election of the new Supreme Soviet." This was done at the
first Congress session from 25 May - 9 June 1989. The Congress
elected 542 Deputies to the Supreme Soviet, elected Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and Anatoliy Lukyanov , a close
Gorbachev protege and candidate Politburo member, Deputy
Chai rman . " The Congress also elected the Committees of the
Supreme Soviet, drawing from deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet
and from Congress deputies that were not elected to the new
standing legislature. The Congress created 14 committees including
the Committee for Defense and State Security, the first such body
dealing with security issues in a Soviet state structure. The
composition of each of the committees was subject to the approval
of the entire Supreme Soviet. Approval of the Committees and the
government were the first issues on the agenda of the opening
session of the Supreme Soviet.
I
1
) While the Congress of People's Deputies obviously played a
crucial role in the democratization of Soviet society, neither the
elections for the Congress nor the Congress sessions are discussed.
JO
^ In March 1990, after a change of heart and considerable
debate, Gorbachev succeeded in having the Congress of People's
Deputies elect him Executive President of the USSR. Lukyanov was
then elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, which Gorbachev
vacated and the post of Deputy Chairman was eliminated. A
discussion of Gorbachev's position as President and the
relationship of the new post vis-a-vis the Supreme Soviet is beyond
the scope of this thesis.
11
B. THE COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS OF DEFENSE AND STATE SECURITY
The week before the Supreme Soviet was to convene, the
committees met, discussed, and approved the candidates for
government posts recommended by Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov.
The Chairman of the Committee for Questions of Defense and State
Security, Vladimir L. Lapygin, was interviewed by Krasnaya Zvezda.
Lapygin is a design engineer specializing in missile guidance, a
designer for the on-board guidance system for the Soviet space
shuttle Buran, and a life-long employee of the Soviet aerospace
industry
.
In the Krasnaya Zvezda interview, Lapygin acknowledged his
"surprise" at being elected committee chairman and outlined what he
thought the KOGB ' s duties were. Early in the interview he
addressed what had become one of the sore points for the military
high command-the issue of stationing troops from the Baltic
republics on their own territories, an issue raised by the Baltic
nationalist movements. While not acknowledging the issue directly,
Lapygin stated that he "could not agree, ... with the viewpoint of
24
"Joint Session Scheduled for 27 June," Daily Report: Soviet
Union, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS-SOV)-
89-121, June 26, 1989, p. 36.
L
" Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Committee for Defense and State
Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet," Report on the USSR, May 11,
1990, p. 9.
According to Lapygin, he and other committee chairmen were
nominated for their positions by Gorbachev and Lukyanov and
approved by the Supreme Soviet. ("The New Soviet Legislature:
Committee on Defense and State Security," Report of the Committee
on Armed Services House of Representatives, No. 8, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., April 11, 1990, p. 5.)
12
a number of deputies from the Baltic republics-representatives of
indigenous nationalities". Lapygin stated ambiguously that the
"chief aim" of his committee was "to strengthen the country's
defense and to control the executive organs operating in this
area." Careful to address both the concerns of the military and
the political leadership, Lapygin stated that among the important
tasks the committee would be performing would be to "elaborate
legislative policy... to ensure our state's security interests"
while on the other hand insuring that "these interests do not
transcend the limits of reasonable sufficiency." The work of the
KOGB would be based on the principles of "new thinking." But he
left no doubts about the future of the military budget by saying
that "such approaches to Soviet defense building make it possible
to reduce military spending on the basis of imparting a new




Lapygin pointed out that the committee would "examine very
important programs for the development of the Army and Navy" with
"due regard" for Soviet military doctrine and reasonable
sufficiency in order to "ensure strategic stability" and the
defense of the USSR and its allies. The KOGB would also "analyze"
how efforts to enhance the quality of the Armed Forces were being
carried out. Then in a comment that could be indicative of from
where the committee intended to draw its information, Lapygin
27
"Lapygin Interviewed on Security Chairmanship," FBIS-SOV-89-
120, June 23, 1989, p. 43.
13
stated that the committee would "listen to the defense minister,
other ministers working for defense and top military leaders." He
added that "if necessary" the KOGB would "go out to the troops and
to defense industry enterprises." Curiously left out are the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which under Eduard Shevardnadze has
moved to play a larger role in determining military policy, and
defense intellectuals attached to the Academy of Sciences who
have often been highly critical of the Soviet military.
Lapygin acknowledged that dedovshchina (hazing or bullying of
junior enlisted personnel by their seniors) remained a problem in
the military, referring to it as "nonregul ation relations". He also
addressed "social problems" in the military, especially those
arising from troop reductions. Lapygin was unclear as to just how
the KOGB would exercise "control" over the Army, saying that "it
was not a question of control in the usual sense of the word" and
that the committee must "control the Armed Forces' state of combat
readiness .
"
Overall, Lapygin took a basically pro-military stance in his
interview with Krasnaya Zvezda which is understandable given his
audience. He did, however, also hit upon the major themes of Soviet
military policy formulated after the Party's 27th Party Congress
(reasonable sufficiency and maintaining strategic parity as the end
goal of Soviet military policy). Lapygin's indication that the
28 Primarily Georgi and Alexi Arbatov and Andrei Kokoshin
25
"Lapygin Interviewed on Security Chairmanship," p. 43
30 Ibid
14
committee will rely (solely, it would seem) on the professional
military for advice was doubtless pleasing to a military leadership
which had grown sensitive to the criticisms of "outsiders."
According to the interview, the KOGB ' s primary duty would be to see
that the military's request for resources remained within the
boundaries of reasonable sufficiency. His comment that the
committee's responsibilities did not include "control in the usual
sense of the word" begs the question of just how much oversight
powers the KOGB will have.
15
IV. THE SUPREME SOVIET CONVENES
A. CONTROVERSY OVER COMPOSITION OF THE KOGB
Controversy over the KOGB arose on the first day of the
convening of the new Supreme Soviet. As mentioned earlier, the
first item on the agenda was the approval of the 14 committees. A
dispute immediately arose over the membership of the KOGB,
indicating a high level of interest in the composition of the
committee.''* The "greatest discussion flared up" in the Soviet of
Nationalities over the composition of the KOGB. Several deputies
were skeptical that the committee would be able to carry out its
"function of control" since the majority of KOGB members came from
the defense sector of the economy. The Chairman of the Soviet of
Nationalities, R. N. Nishanov, responded that like other
committees, the KOGB "includes people's deputies who are
professionally involved in these matters." Deputies from Lithuania
and Kazakhstan were also dissatisfied that no representatives from
their republics were on the KOGB. A Lithuanian delegate attributed
the exclusion of a Lithuanian representative to the fact that the
J1 In seeming contrast to the amount of interest in the KOGB
indicated by the high level of debate over the composition of the
committee, the House Armed Services Committee report on the KOGB
mentions one member stating that few Supreme Soviet members
"initially showed interest" in the committee. (Report of the
Committee on Armed Services, p. 5.) The deputy's statement also
runs counter to a statement by G. Sturua that "the greatest number
of applications was submitted" for membership on the KOGB.
("Defense, State Security Committee Viewed," World Economy and
International Relations , No. 1, January 1990)
16
majority of the Lithuanian delegates belonged to the separatist
Sajudis movement. An additional proposal was put forward to include
representatives of all union republics on the KOGB . Evidently
losing patience at both the tenacity of those making the argument
and the repeated raising of the issue, Chairman Nishanov "called on
everyone to engage in a constructive, calm discussion" saying that
no one would be excluded from the "discussion of important
questions" relating to either the republics or the Union. The
resolution of the objection of the Lithuanian and Kazakh deputies
would have to be resolved in conjunction with the Soviet of the
Union. The composition of the committee was approved "taking into
account the proposals" submitted by the deputies. The Soviet of the
Union took up the issue that evening and once again "lively debates
developed" during the discussion of the composition of the KOGB.
The Soviet of the Union, after changing the membership of the KOGB
for the "umpteenth time," approved the inclusion of Lithuanian and




As approved by both chambers of the Supreme Soviet, the
Committee on Defense and State Security contains 43 members
including 12 apparently working in the defense industry, six
military officers (three of them high-ranking flag officers, two
32
"Chambers Hold Separate Sittings," FBIS-SOV-89-122 , June 27,
1989, pp. 30-31. (originally in Sovetskaya Rossiya, June 27, 1989,
pp. 1-2); "Debate on Defense Committee Analyzed," FBIS-SOV-89-124
,
June 29, 1989, pp. 41-43. (originally in Krasnaya Zvezda, June 29,
1989, p. 3); "Defense Committee Makeup Debated," FBIS-SOV-89-121
June 26, 1989, pp. 39-40. (originally by TASS International Service
1057 GMT June 26, 1989.
)
17
younger reformist officers, and the last the deputy chairman of the
committee), three high-ranking KGB officers, eight party and
government officials (including two high-ranking Party officials in
charge of defense industry), and two scientists. The rest are
educators, industry officials, and three reformist intellectuals.
The committee is divided into three subcommittees: Armed Forces,
if
Defense Industry, and State Security.
The controversy over the composition of the KOGB is one of the
more interesting developments in the opening session of the Supreme
Soviet. That some deputies are distrustful of what they perceive as
the over-representation of the defense sector on the committee, and
thus its impartiality, could be indicative of general distrust of
the defense community in the Supreme Soviet. This would seem
particularly true in light of the deputies' willingness to allow
their compatriots to sit on other committees where their expertise
lies. The committee's sensitivity to this criticism became evident
when Lapygin later got up before the Supreme Soviet and broke down
by percentages the areas of expertise of the members of his
committee pointing out that the "majority of comrades" on the KOGB
were "in no way linked to military production." Apparently sensing
the deputies' skepticism towards the committees ability to examine
defense issues with a critical eye, Lapygin tried to convince the
deputies that "from the point of view of criticism of the military
Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Committee on Defense and State
Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet," p. 8. (The members of the
Committee for Defense and State Security are listed in appendix A.)
Report of the Committee on Armed Services, pp. 5-6.
18
and industrial complex, this is not bad." He also acknowledged,
however, that this "creates a certain difficulty in our committee's
work" and that since the issues dealt with the "strategy of arming
and providing for defense to state security," "specialists" were
needed
.
The issue of republican representation on the committee also
illustrated both the nascent assertiveness of the republics to
protect (or establish) their autonomy and their sensitivity to
Ministry of Defense decisions affecting their republics. Both of
these controversies could be indicators of the amount of influence
the KOGB may be able to exert vis-a-vis the Supreme Soviet.
At the opening of the Supreme Soviet, Lapygin gave an
interview to Izvestia where he once again talked about the duties
of the KOGB and where, for the first time, he addressed the issues
of secrecy and the relationship between his committee and the KGB.
He also expressed some thoughts that appeared to conflict with
those expressed earlier in Krasnaya Zvezda.
Lapygin described the KOGB ' s "objective" in "general terms" as
"reliably ensuring the country's reasonable defense capability and
security at optimum expenditure." He pointed out, as he had earlier
in Krasnaya Zvezda, that defense decisions must be based upon the
principles of "new thinking" but added that "equally
35
"Lapygin on Defense Committee , "FBIS-SOV-89-124 , June 29,
1989, pp. 37-38.
n
"Lapygin Explains Security Committee's Rol e , "FBIS-SOV-89-
124, June 29, 1989, pp. 43-45. (originally in Izvestia, June 27,
1989, p. 2)
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important ... the real economic difficulties experienced by the
people." Lapygin also indicated that the debate on defense decision
making would be considerabl y more open than previously indicated by
hoping that "the consideration of alternative opinions to specific
decisions and the involvement of experts and specialists who view
problems from unorthodox angles will become the rule in the work of
the committee." He once again had to defend the inclusion of
officials associated with the defense industry, saying that as far
as the Committee on Agrarian Questions was concerned, "no one had
any misgivings about the fact that most of its members were
agriculture specialists."
Regarding state secrets, which the interviewer gave as the
reason for past "rejection" for "outside intervention in the
affairs of the Ministry of Defense and the KGB," Lapygin stated
that there were "fewer secrets now" and that remaining state
secrets related to the "creation of new types of arms and
technological priorities in their development and production."
Lapygin acknowledged that state secrets were still necessary
because "we are forced to compete with other countries." As an
example, Lapygin pointed out that the U.S. was aware of the
Soviets' "developing systems which are capable in principle of
countering their SDI," but that this did not mean that the Soviets
had to furnish the U.S. with the results of the work.
Lapygin also equated military secrets with "commercial




Admitting that the Soviet penchant for secrecy sometimes got out of
hand, Lapygin said that "unjustified secrecy" remained.
Specifically he spoke of the locations of obvious "major military
enterprises" of which the "whole world knows about." Pointing out
the necessity "to rid ourselves of primitive spy mania," Lapygin
was even more critical of using the "mantle of secrecy" to "hide
all kinds of problems and shortcomings." Lapygin ended his
discussion about secrecy by noting that "psuedosecrecy" hampered
the "introduction of useful ideas into the civilian economy" saying
this represented "a whole treasure trove of untapped potential."
Still, for the KOGB Chairman, the problem of state secrecy remained
a "complex one." v0
Lapygin was asked how the KOGB was going to "monitor" the work
of the Armed Forces and (for the first time) the KGB. Lapygin
indicated that the committee would draw information both from
within these organizations and from without. Claiming that the
committee would "listen to heads of departments and their
deputies," he also said it would be necessary to establish a
"system of extradepartmental experts" and use "information provided
by the public, the press, and the population." Despite this, "an
efficient monitoring mechanism" has not been established yet, but
it must have a "legal basis." Speaking directly of the KGB, Lapygin
said there was a "need for oversight of the KGB on the part of the
organs of soviet power and on the part of the public." To Lapygin




qualitative improvement of the structure of the KGB at the center
and at the local level.""
On military issues, Lapygin was asked about his attitude
towards a "professional army." He believed that "such an army
would be stronger than the current one" and felt that the
increasing sophistication of military equipment and "conscripts
("yesterday's schoolchildren") inability to handle it skillfully"
made a professional army necessary. Lapygin also pointed out that
the trend towards increased manning by "specialist officers,
warrant officers, and ensigns" would only increase in the future.
The KOGB Chairman was not sure what the cost of such a force would
be, but that "in-depth analysis and discussions" would be
necessary. Lapygin did disagree with those who discarded the idea
"point blank" because it was "not to the taste of certain military
leaders." 40
On other matters, Lapygin came out strongly against the use of
the Army in "conflicts inside the country" calling it "extremely
undesirable" and the responsibility of MVD troops. He gave strong
backing to military R&D projects saying that the conversion of
defense industries to civilian production should not lead to the
"dismantling or placing on starvation rations" the "scientific
research institutes, design bureaus, and their experimental plants"
that create "new types of arms." Lapygin stated unequivocally that




USSR would run the risk of "falling seriously behind our
competitors." He called the mass production of new arms "another
matter," saying it "swallows up" a "large part of the resources
devoted to the defense industry." In Lapygin's opinion, this is
where reductions must take place and be "reoriented towards
civilian needs." The chairman was extremely critical of the
"duplication in the work of the defense complexes."
Lapygin's Izvestia interview was different from his Krasnaya
Zvezda interview of a few days earlier in that he took a more
pronounced pro-reform stand and said some things that probably
would not sit well with the high command. His talk of considering
"alternative options" and eliciting the involvement of experts and
specialists with "unorthodox" views as a "rule" in committee work
is different from his statements in Krasnaya Zvezda where he
indicated emphasis upon seeking advice from the professional
military. The high command has grown increasingly resentful of the
intrusion of such "amateurs" in the military arts.
In saying that he was opposed to the misuse of secrecy to
cover mistakes and shortcomings, Lapygin gave a vote of support to
military glasnost, a subject that the high command has increasingly
railed against. Another opinion that could not have been pleasing
to the generals was his tentative endorsement of a "professional
army." While hinting that the adoption of such an idea would be
dependent upon the cost, Lapygin did feel a professional army would




necessitated it. His comment that the idea should not be abandoned
because "certain military leaders" might be opposed to it (the most
outspoken of whom were Minister of Defense Yazov and Chief of the
General Staff Moiseev!), was a direct rebuff to the military
leadership and seemingly put him on a collision course with the
high command.
But there were some issues on which Lapygin's line of thinking
appeared more "conventional." His discussion of state secrets did
not establish a definitive criteria by which information could be
evaluated and, more importantly for the committee and those
interested in following its development, provide an idea of the
"openness" of the committee's deliberations. His most interesting
statement was the acknowledgement that the secrecy surrounding the
defense industry "hampered" the crossover of technology into the
civilian economy. However, by stressing that the problem was a
"complex" one, Lapygin did not open any new doors nor did he
promise to in the future. Lapygin also sided with the military by
coming out against the use of the army to quell internal unrest in
the Soviet Union and his insistence that R&D into new types of
weapons must not be victim of planned reduced defense spending.
Lapygin shed no light on how the committee planned to monitor
the KGB other than acknowledging the necessity for "oversight." His
comment about the lack of an "efficient monitoring mechanism" is an
accurate assessment of the problem and hardly cause for confidence
on the part of those calling for reform of the security apparatus.
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B. DEFENSE POLICY AND THE SUPREME SOVIET
On the second day of the opening session of the Supreme
Soviet, Prime Minister Nikolai I. Ryzhkov outlined the government's
proposals that would be presented to the legislature and debated
among the deputies. In discussing defense matters, Ryzhkov singled
out "two problems that were dealt with by the relevant committee"
of the Supreme Soviet "during the examination of the program
submitted by the Ministry of Defense." According to Ryzhkov, the
first problem was defense spending. He stated that on the basis of
"the new military doctrine," the government would "consistently
implement measures to reduce" defense spending. Efforts to ensure
the Soviet Union's defense capability "must be based solely on the
requirements of reasonable sufficiency." Ryzhkov indicated that
this had already caused some conflict within the KOGB where "the
exchange of views about this became a serious conversation about
changes that must take place in the activity of the Defense
Ministry .
"
Stating that the second problem was the need to ensure the
military's supply of modern weaponry at a time of diminishing
resources, the Prime Minister said that reasonable sufficiency
"must be backed up by the further technical reequipping of the
Armed Forces on a qualitatively new basis." Ryzhkov also sought to
soothe the Armed Forces' wounds over public criticism by
acknowledging the "obligation" to support the Armed Forces and "to
do everything for its prestige and authority to be strengthened and
held in high regard." Ryzhkov then suggested that a portion of some
25
of the savings from reduced defense spending should be directed
towards "tackling the social problems of the Armed Forces."* 2
Ryzhkov's comments are interesting in that by noting the
"serious conversation" arising from the "exchange of views" in the
KOGB , they provide a brief glimpse of the conflict that apparently
existed in the committee over (at least the degree of) reductions
in defense spending. By noting that these discussions took place
over "changes that must take place" in the way the Ministry of
Defense does business, Ryzhkov put his weight behind the growing
calls for reform in the Defense Ministry,
1. The Defense Minister Before the Supreme Soviet
After approving the membership of the various committees,
the next item on the Supreme Soviet's agenda was the confirmation
of the government as proposed by Prime Minister Ryzhkov. One of the
members up for confirmation was Army General Dimitri Yazov as
Minister of Defense. Yazov's confirmation hearing would be the
first instance of the new Supreme Soviet finding its voice on
defense policy issues and intruding into an area that previously
had been the exclusive realm of the high command.
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"Ryzhkov's 27 June Report to Supreme Soviet , "FBIS-SOV-89-
123, June 28, 1989, pp. 34-41. (originally in Pravda, June 27,
1989, p. 2.)
Yazov was promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet
Union on April 28, 1990, making him the first Marshal on active
duty since early 1989. Stephen Foye points out that Yazov's
promotion, coming on the eve of celebrations marking the 45th
anniversary of the Soviet victory in World War II, represents
another effort by Gorbachev to placate an increasingly restive
military high command. (Radio Liberty Daily Report, April 30,
1990. )
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General Yazov, whom the KOGB approved for remaining on as
Defense Minister, appeared before the Supreme Soviet on 3 July
1989. Yazov would first speak and then answer questions from
deputies. Yazov began his speech by noting that the defense policy
of the USSR was the responsibility of the "supreme political
leadership of the country." He then added that "reduction of the
Armed Forces, drafts, and other measures associated with
organizational development" were also determined by the political
1 eadership
.
Then, wasting no time in addressing contentious issues,
Yazov stated his opposition to a proposal before the Supreme Soviet
releasing students on active military service. Yazov told the
Supreme Soviet that as a result of the reduction of 500,000
personnel in the Armed Forces, over 300,000 students of "higher and
secondary education establishments" had not been called up. As far
as releasing an additional 176,000 students already on active
service from 1987 and 1988, Yazov commented that roughly half of
the questions he received from deputies (he claimed to receive over
400 total) dealt with the possibility of releasing the students
early. Yazov maintained that these students were "a very highly
trained part of the Armed Forces" and that releasing them early
from service "would undoubtedly have an effect on the combat
readiness of the Armed Forces." Realizing that "any decision could
be made," Yazov nevertheless stated unequivocally that "at the
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"Yazov Addresses 3 July Session , "FEIS-SOV-89-127 , July 5,
1989, p. 40.
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present moment there is no possibility of discharging these
comrades, and they must do the length of service that is laid down
by the law." 45
The Defense Minister then turned his attention to another
contentious issue. Yazov also received "a great many questions"
about the possibility of servicemen being assigned to their home
regions. General Yazov pointed out that such a practice would lead
to conflicts about determining who would serve in the Armed Forces
in the area of the Warsaw Pact countries and, by extension, to any
branch of the Armed Forces. Calling such questions "impermissible,"
he did say however, that it was "another matter" to allow some
troops to serve in their home republics "in order to have a trained
contingent of personnel" for mobilization purposes.
On other issues, Yazov believed that the recent decision
to unilaterally reduce the Armed Forces was "appropriate to this
specific historical time" and to "the state of tension in the
world." However, Yazov noted that as of yet the NATO countries had
not responded to Soviet reductions. Regarding the issue of a
"professional army," Yazov stated outright that it was a suggestion
the Soviet Union "cannot afford." Yazov reminded the deputies that
the Soviet Armed Forces are already 50% professional. As far as
what to with the money saved from reduced defense spending, Yazov
thought that it would "be better" to release it to military




resolved as well." In the end, Yazov deferred to the Supreme
Soviet, saying that whatever it decided, "that's the way it should
be." He stated that the Ministry of Defense would merely submit a
request and live with the decision of the Supreme Soviet.
Yazov's speech was essentially conciliatory in tone,
perhaps reflecting his anticipation of a possible hostile grilling
48by the Supreme Soviet deputies. The General was supportive of
recent Party decisions regarding military policy (though his
comment that the political leadership was responsible for
reductions indirectly underscored the military's late hour
opposition to the idea), arms control, and relations with the West.
Yazov did once again, however, stake out his claim on areas which
he had spoken of before. He repeated in no uncertain terms his
opposition to the early release of students from service, to the
proposal for stationing troops on their home territory, and to the
formation of a professional Army. He agreed with the calls for
reduced defense spending to address other problems of society,
though true to his bureaucracy, he hoped that money saved would go
towards research and development. He did however, defer all final
decisions on the allocation of resources to the Supreme Soviet.
Yazov had made a gesture of goodwill towards the Supreme Soviet,
doubtless hoping he would receive the same.
{1 Ibid.
, pp. 42-43.
^ Stephen Foye, "Yazov Survives Hostile Reappointment Debate,"
Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty Research Report, July 24,
1989, p. 4. (Foye points out that Yazov took a "particularly
conciliatory attitude towards the operations of the Supreme Soviet"
in the weeks prior to his reappointment hearings.)
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The questioning of General Yazov by Supreme Soviet
deputies has been described by several analysts as "difficult,"
"intense criticism," "grilling," "attacked vigorously,"
"acrimonious," "contentious," "hostile," etc. Certainly Yazov
was one of the most thoroughly "grilled" ministers up for
confirmation and the "rough" treatment accorded him as standing
Minister of Defense was unprecedented from a body that previously
had been viewed as a "rubber stamp" parliament. General Yazov'
s
irritation at such treatment was clearly evident in the curt, often
defensive manner with which he answered some of the deputies
inquiries. Yazov was asked about measures to "increase discipline"
in the Armed Forces, especially efforts to cut back the incidents
of dedovshchina. He was asked to explain if there was any residual
radioactivity affecting the country as a result of the country's
nuclear testing program and was criticized for the military's
conducting nuclear tests on 6 August, the date of the atomic
bombing of Hiroshima. Deputies criticized a number of issues
relating to the military including the role of "political bodies"
in the Army as "wholly negative," and the "overly generous
retirement conditions" for Army generals. One deputy criticized
the lack of professionalism in the Army and the unilateral
reductions. Yazov came under personal criticism as well. He was
^ 9 Stephen Foye, "The Soviet Armed Forces in 1989," Report on
the USSR, January 26, 1989; "Yazov Survives Contentious
Confirmation Debate," Report on the USSR, July 21, 1989, George C.
Weickhardt, "Moiseev versus Yazov: Backlash in the Armed Forces?"
Report en the USSR, Alexander Rahr , "Gorbachev Disci oses Details of
Defense Council," Report on the USSR, September 15, 1989.
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too old, "insensitive to people's needs," and had not lived up to
the "high hopes" that had initially been placed in him. Deputies
also suggested that Yazov be replaced. General Moiseev, Chief of
the General Staff, and General Colonel Boris Gromov, the last
commander of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and then commander of the
Kiev Military District, were put forward as possible
replacements
.
Yazov was not without his supporters though. Two members
of the KOGB , Chairman Lapygin and Marshal of the Soviet Union
Akhromeyev, spoke out in support. But the most crucial support for
the embattled Defense Minister came from the man who gave him his
job, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Gorbachev. Gorbachev chose to
speak out because the debate over Yazov's appointment had gotten to
the point that Gorbachev believed he had to speak out as Chairman
of the Defense Council. Gorbachev first pointed out that the
Supreme Soviet was "going to have to think through. .. how we are
going to discuss the problems of the Army." He reminded deputies
that "all issues relating to defense and security" should not be
discussed in the Supreme Soviet. That, after all, was why
committees had been established. Based upon his interpretation of
the questioning of Yazov, Gorbachev observed that "we are
exaggerating the role of the USSR Defense Minister." Gorbachev
pointed out that the Defense Council (of which Yazov is only one
member), by making the "decision on all key issues," bears a lot of
~ "Yazov Answers Deputies' Questions , "FBIS-SOV-89-127 , July
5, 1989, p. 45-48. "Yazov Candidacy Discussed , "FBIS-SOV-89-129
,
July 7, 1989, pp. 62-63.
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the responsibility for defense issues. Gorbachev then recited the
familiar litany of problems in the Soviet military. Commenting
on Yazov, Gorbachev pointed out that the General "occupied
progressive positions," but that Gorbachev, like other deputies,
was "not satisfied with his replies on a number of questions."
Gorbachev attributed this to Yazov's apprehension about revealing
state secrets, but that he had not "found the best answer on a
number of issues." Gorbachev faulted Yazov for becoming
"irritated," calling it "impermissible" for anyone in the Supreme
Soviet. But Gorbachev did eventually come to Yazov's defense
pointing out that he had been recommended by the Defense Council
and that Gorbachev "would not interrupt his activities now, seeing
all the pluses and minuses of this man." Gorbachev stated that
Yazov had not been in office long enough "to fully master this
business," but that he had the "potential for doing so." Gorbachev
closed his comments by siding neither with Yazov or the republics
on the stationing of troops issue, faulting each side for "trying
to score points," and felt that "more work should be done on the
student's question." Then bringing the discussion on Yazov's
nomination to a close, he called for a vote. Out of the deputies




" "Gorbachev Speech Supports Yazov , "FBIS-SOV-89-127 , July 5,
1989, pp. 48-51. (There is some question as to how many deputies
were present for the Yazov vote. Gorbachev mentions 429, but the
total vote figures account for only 399.)
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Thus General Yazov survived his ordeal . But as Foye
points out, this may have been due in large part to changes in the
Supreme Soviet's voting rules that had been adopted the morning of
the debate. This begs the question as to whether the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet (headed by Gorbachev) anticipated difficulty
with Yazov's confirmation. The new rules allowed a candidate to be
elected after receiving a majority of the votes of deputies
present. The earlier rules required an absolute majority (272 votes
out of 542) for confirmation
.
vu Yazov's 256 votes were a clear
majority of the deputies present. Whether he would have survived a
vote of the full Supreme Soviet can only be guessed at. It
certainly would have been close either way.
Yazov's grilling by deputies demonstrated the enthusiasm
with which delegates approached their first opportunity to have
some input in defense policy and the degree of dissatisfaction many
felt with the military's performance, especially with its being a
voracious consumer of state resources. Yazov became a lightning rod
for these frustrations, but his own mediocrity (as perceived by the
deputies) also acted as a magnet for criticism. Gorbachev's speech
in defense of Yazov was certainly crucial to his confirmation. But
this was probably due more to Gorbachev's assertion that the role
of the Defense Minister was "overrated" and that the Defense
Council had the leading part in defense policy than to any defense
of Yazov's performance to date. Essentially, Yazov owes his
" Stephen Foye, "Yazov Survives Hostile Reappointment Debate,
p. 4.
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election to the downplaying of his role rather than the weight of
his influence. The military high command as a whole could not have
been very happy with Yazov's confirmation process in that, in its
first appearance before the Supreme Soviet, it met with widespread
criticism. It also did not help that to most observers Gorbachev
had to intervene to save the Defense Minister. For the high
command, this was yet another example of anti-military feeling
generated by criticism of the military permitted under glasnost. In
its first encounter with the Supreme Soviet, the high command had
survived a close, but highly embarrassing call. The next would be
a resounding defeat.
2. The Vote on Early Release of Students
As mentioned earlier, the issue of the early release of
students from military service was to be put to a vote before the
Supreme Soviet. The high command, in the person of Yazov before the
same body and on several other occasions, had come out decisively
against the idea. On 11 July, one week after Yazov's confirmation
hearing, in which the Defense Minister stated there was "no
possibility" of realizing students early, and after "more work" was
supposed to have been done on the issue on the behest of Chairman
Gorbachev, Prime Minister Ryzhkov brought the motion up before the
Supreme Soviet for a vote. As laid out by Ryzhkov, the discharge of
176,000 students would reduce combat troop strength "in terms of
sergeants and soldiers" 4.8%. After some questioning over whether
the reductions would include the Navy (it would), the vote was
taken. There were only five votes against the proposal and three
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abstentions. As First Vice-chairman Lukyanov, who was presiding
over the vote, put it, the proposal "passed... by the overwhelming
majority
.
The vote to release students early from military service
was a stinging defeat for the high command especially after it had
come out so strongly against the proposal and given the
overwhelming majority of the affirmative vote (probably at least
400)." Soviet media reported the event in an almost gleeful
tone, with TASS noting the "storm of applause" that greeted the
proposal and domestic radio even reporting that it was "strange"
that "five deputies voted against the decision." Lukyanov also
laughingly pointed out that the Supreme Soviet was sent "huge
bunches of roses" after the vote.
C. THE FIRST SUPREME SOVIET: AFTERMATH
The first session of the Supreme Soviet was a watershed for
both the military high command and the Supreme Soviet deputies. In
its first two encounters with the new legislature, the military
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"Ryzhkov Speaks to Assembly , "FBIS-SOV-89-132 , July 12, 1989,
pp. 57-58.
Author note: I was not able to find a total affirmative
count, but regardless of the actual number, given the total
membership of 542 (of which some were undoubtedly absent), it was
still, as Lukyanov stated, overwhelming.
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"Proposal on Student Conscripts Passed , "FBIS-SOV-89-132 .
July 12, 1989, ?. 59. (originally by TASS, July 11, 1989.) "Radio
Reports Conscript Decision , "FBIS-SOV-89-132
,
?. 59.
" "Lukyanov Interviewed on Supreme Soviet Results
,
"FBIS-SOV-
89-152, August 9, 1989, p. 28.
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leadership had narrowly averted defeat at the confirmation hearings
of Defense Minister Yazov and suffered an embarrassing defeat over
the student draft issue. Both of these incidents could hardly be
reassuring to the high command about the level of influence it
would be able to exert over the Supreme Soviet as a whole. However,
given the unprecedented criticisms of the military that had become
vogue under glasnost , the high command possibly was not expecting
to wield overwhelming influence in the Supreme Soviet. The high
command is probably more optimistic about the degree of influence
it can wield in the KOGB and thus, through it, wield more influence
on defense policy debates.
For the Supreme Soviet deputies the experience of the Yazov
confirmation debate and the vote to release students from their
military service has probably engendered a sense of confidence
regarding its ability to take on the Ministry of Defense on certain
issues. It is likely to entertain more criticism and questioning of
military prerogatives like high command opposition to a
"professional" army and calls for reevaluating or canceling major
weapons system programs such as construction of aircraft
carriers." This challenging of high command prerogatives is also
likely since, as the controversy over the composition of the KOGB
demonstrated, the deputies evidently are skeptical about the




" Andrei Kortunov, and Igor Malashenko, "'Tbilisi,' v Riga,'
and the Rest," New Times , December 19-25, 1989, ?. 28.
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With the new Supreme Soviet and its committees now established
and functioning, the legislative debate over Soviet defense policy
would move to the mechanism set up for that purpose - the Committee
for Defense and State Security.
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V. THE KOGB AND DEFENSE POLICY
A. THE ROLE OF THE KOGB
As its title would suggest, the Committee on Defense and State
Security could conceivably deal with a wide range of issues dealing
with Soviet defense policy including oversight of the budgets of
the Ministry of Defense and KGB, confirmation of the two
organization's ministers, and consent (in conjunction with the
Committee on International Relations) on ratification of
58international treaties affecting Soviet security policy.
However, as the House Armed Services Committee report on the
committee points out, much of what the KOGB is doing at this time
is "ad hoc" and several members have indicated the committee's
agenda has not been fully decided upon. This stems not only from
the wide variety of issues that could conceivably fall within the
KOGB ' s area of interest, but also because organizationally, the
committee is not yet up to its tasks. Nonetheless, the committee
has begun its work on four issues: defense spending, conversion of
defense industries to civilian production, drafting a law on
defense, and military reform. This chapter examines the work of the
committee on the issues of the defense budget and military reform.
to
Report of tke Committee en Armed Services, -pp. 4-5.
Ibid.
, p . 4 & 8
.
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B. THE KOGB AND DEFENSE SPENDING
The issue that has taken up most of the KOGB ' s time to date is
determining the level of Soviet defense spending. Committee member
Stanislav P. Golovin described the defense budget and the "budget
of defense industry" as the committee's "main work." Cv
1. The Defense Budget for 1990
The Supreme Soviet's second session dealt primarily with
the state budget. As part of determining the state budget, the KOGB
reviewed proposed figures for Soviet defense spending for 1990 in
October 1989. According to one Soviet source, the KOGB ' s "working
groups" (presumably subcommittees) "undertook a clause by clause
(J!
analysis" of the draft 1990 defense budget."* This seemingly
contradicts the statement of one KOGB member who stated that
defense spending figures provided to the committee were general,
non-specific figures with details concerning specific programs not
provided. At least some KOGB defense budget deliberations were
also attended by representatives from the Ministry of Finance,
Ministry of Defense, and State Planning Committee (Gosplan).*"
According to committee chairman Lapygin, the KOGB meetings were
v0
"Supreme Soviet Defense, Security Work Described
,
"FBIS-SOV-
89-194, October 10, 1989, p. 55. (See also Lapygin's interviews
with Krasnaya Zvezda (pp. 13-15) and Izvestia (pp. 20-24) above.)
World Economy and International Relations , No. 1, January
1990, p. 82.
" Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Committee on Defense and State
Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet," p. 10.
"Defense Security Panel Deliberations Viewed , "FBIS-SOV-89-
199, October 17, 1989, p. 54.
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first addressed by Minister of Defense Yazov who presented an
assessment of the pol itical -military situation on the world, and
Chief of the General Staff Moiseev, who spoke on the state of the
Armed Forces. The committee also planned to hear from the
commanders of the military services (Ground, Strategic Rocket
Forces, Navy, Air Forces, Air Defense Forces, etc.) who would
outline their plans for the funds allocated to their respective
commands. According to Krasnaya Zvezda, the committee
recommended that certain "points" be considered in discussing the
draft defense budget. These were: that in "conditions of defense
cuts" the emphasis on defense budget considerations must be on
"developing and supplying the country's Armed Forces with modern,
highly effective military equipment;" that consideration be given
to discontinuing the production of obsolete equipment thus reducing
"the product range" of defense equipment; and that the "social
thrust" of the defense budget be reinforced noting that the
"poverty line runs quite close to military settlements.""*
These initial KOGB meetings on the defense budget were
not without controversy. Committee member Golovin pointed out that
he was "not satisfied" with General Yazov's report and the figures
given to the committee regarding military spending. Golovin stated
that the figures were "not specific," that no comparative figures
" "Defense Committee Chairman Interviewed," FBIS-SOV-89-194
,
October 10, 1989, p. 56 (originally published in Krasnaya Zvezda,
October 6, 1989, p. 1.)
Report of the Committee on Armed Services
,
p. 9.
* "Defense Security Panel Deliberations Viewed," p. 55.
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were provided, and that some of the "formulations" were not backed
up by specific figures. Saying, "We have many questions for the
general staff and Defense Ministry on this report," Golovin called
for more detailed figures on the defense budget. Reportedly, one
deputy said that the KOGB still did not know how much was being
spent on defense and that the government's system made arriving at
(JO
a figure very difficult. G. Sturua, in World Economy, also
pointed out that KOGB ' S discussion of the military budget "has been
of a general nature" because of the "lack of detail in available
figures." He also implied criticism of the KOGB ' s handling of the
budget hearings, noting that "very little time was available for
such a serious matter.""' In contrast to fellow committee member
Golovin's negative impression, KOGB chairman Lapygin, when asked by
Krasnaya Zvezda how the discussion of the defense budget was
proceeding, assessed the committee's discussion of the defense
budget as "positive as a whole."'" Krasnaya Zvezda also pointed out
that, evidently in committee discussion of the military's "social
issues," the "most varied opinions and sometimes diametrically
7 1
opposed viewpoints, have been expressed."" Reflecting the limits
of glasnost regarding the committee's work, Lapygin stated that
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(for at least Generals Yazov's and Moiseev's presentations before
the committee) KOGB hearings were closed and no stenographic record
made. Lapygin did say, however, that an open session was planned
for the discussion of defense conversion.
The Soviet defense budget for 1990 as finally approved by
the KOGB and Supreme Soviet was R70.9 billion, or 8.2% (R6.3
billion) less than the figure for 1989. 73 While the KOGB was still
discussing the draft defense budget (which evidently passed with
little changes), some committee members went out of their way to
justify the "sufficiency" of the proposed reductions, evidently
sensitive to charges that proposed cuts were not deep enough.
Marshal Akhromeyev believed that reducing the defense budget by
"even" R6.3 billion would "take a great struggle," though he
acknowledged the threat of further defense cuts saying, "Clearly,
the Supreme Soviet committees and commissions could propose a
larger reduction in defense spending." Despite the "struggle" that
would entail from reducing defense spending, Akhromeyev believed
the proposed reductions were "well thought out" and satisfied the
"minimum needs of the Armed Forces." However, Gorbachev's military
7?
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"Defense Ministry Reports 1990 Military Spending," FBIS-SOV-
89-241, December 18, 1989, p. 122. (This is the official Soviet
figure for defense spending. This thesis does not endeavor to
discuss the accuracy of this figure which is a cause of
considerable controversy both in the West and in the USSR. For
discussion of the debate about estimates of Soviet defense
spending, see Alexander R. Alexiev and Robert C. Nurick, The Soviet
Military Under Gorbachev , Rand Corporation, February 1990, pp. 36-
40, and George G. Weickhardt, "Recent Discussion of Defense
Economics," Report on the USSR, March 9, 1990, pp. 9-10.)
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advisor did feel that reductions in research and development
allocations were "undesirable" but deferred to the Supreme Soviet,
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saying it had the "final say."
Lapygin also was emphatic in stating that the defense
budget had been cut as much as was possible. Speaking on behalf of
the committee, he pointed out that "in the current international
situation" the proposed R6.3 billion reduction for 1990 was the
"maximum by which the military budget can be cut." Any further
reductions "would raise serious doubts about the sufficiency of our
defense." Lapygin said that the USSR was the only country
"currently" reducing its defense spending, contrasting this with
the alleged planned defense spending increases in the U.S. and
IE
Federal Republic of Germany.
KOGB member and Deputy Minister of Defense Army General
Vitaliy Shabanov also underscored the "impossibility" of further
reductions in defense spending. Speaking before the Supreme Soviet,
Shabanov also referred to the planned reduction in the 1990 defense
budget as a "maximum," saying it was "impossible to move further."
Then indicating that the military had been rebuffed on the issue of
ft
reducing R S D funds," Shabanov said that reducing defense
spending had also been achieved by "unfortunately halting or
rescheduling" several "scientific research and experimental design
74
"Akhromeyev Interviewed on Defense Budget," FBIS-SOV-89-193
,
October 6, 1989, P. 74.
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" "Lapygin on Discussion of Defense Spending," FBIS-SOV-89-
207, October 27, 1989, p. 50.
'" see Akhromeyev' s comments above.
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projects." In the face of continued Western research and
development, this was doubtless "undesirable." Shabanov repeated
his opposition to reductions in R & D funding again early in 1990,
saying that while it was something he did not agree with, it was
something that could not be helped. He stated that by reducing the
amount of funding for "purchasing weapons and military
78
construction," it was possible to increase officer's pay.
Chief of the General Staff Moiseev also voiced his
opposition to reduced R&D funding, saying that the USSR could not
7Q
"lag behind the leading states and their armies..."
2. Future Budgets: Controversy Over Further Cuts?
As the above comments illustrate, some of the members of
the KOGB and the high command have gone to considerable lengths to
point out the "sufficiency" of proposed defense reductions for the
1990 budget. They have also made the case that the 1990 budget
could not be reduced further without an adverse impact on Soviet
defense efforts. But what about future defense budgets? Will the
Soviets continue to reduce their defense spending as they have
indicated? There appears to be some division in the KOGB over
whether any additional cuts are necessary and under what conditions
the budget will be further reduced.
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Akhromeyev 's comment that the Supreme Soviet could have
called for further cuts in the defense budget for 1990" probably
also reflects military concern over calls for further cuts in
defense spending in future budgets. In anticipation of this, some
are attempting to set the conditions under which future cuts can be
made
.
Akhromeyev specifically addressed the issue of further
reductions in military spending saying that any "radical reduction"
a
1
in spending must be the result of a "bilateral process.""*
KOGB chairman Lapygin sought to "make it clear" that
Soviet intentions to keep reducing the defense budget "largely
depends on the result of disarmament talks." Should these talks
prove successful, Lapygin thought it would be possible to reduce
defense expenditures by half-to R38 billion by 1995. In a joint
interview with U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed
Services Chairman Les Aspin, Lapygin said that while the aim of the
KOGB was "to steadily reduce defense spending. . .this will depend on
the results of the arms talks." Lapygin also stated that the KOGB
would "watch the military budget discussion of the U.S. Congress"
and then make conclusions "about our own defense spending."
see p. 43.
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In his comments on Soviet defense spending for 1990,
General Shabanov acknowledged the possibility of future defense
cuts but that "this would be carried out on a reciprocal basis.'
Possibly reflecting concern over future military cuts and doubtless
sensitive to glasnost-inspired criticism of the military, Shabanov
apparently felt he had to go so far as to justify the existence of
the armed forces. He reminded the Supreme Soviet that "every
country inevitably has to have Armed Forces," and that for the
"foreseeable future," security could not be achieved through
"political methods alone."""
Chief of the General Staff Moiseev held out the
possibility of further reductions "in the event of progress at the
talks in Geneva and Vienna." Moiseev also answered critics of some
Soviet weapons programs who questioned whether it was "sensible" to
build "heavy aircraft carriers and large nuclear submarines and
Of
other expensive military equipment." For Moiseev the answer was
"clear" in that the Soviets could not "lag behind" now because they
87
would "not be able to catch up later."
Moiseev and Shabanov also pointed out the increased cost
of modern weapons, thus implying another reason for skepticism
regarding further defense cuts. Moiseev noted that defense
industries had "switched to full economic accountability and self-
34
"Reaction to 8.2% Cut in Defense Budget," p. 103.
85
"Shabanov Address," p. 65.
86 see p. 38.
01
"General Moiseev Discusses the Defense Budget," p. 85
46
financing" with the result that the cost of "some types of
[defense] work has increased 2-3 times and more." 00 Shabanov has
repeatedly made the same argument, calling the increase in prices
"considerable" and faulting many defense enterprises for "exceeding
the established rates."" He has also repeatedly argued (in keeping
with the Soviet's "defensive doctrine") that defensive weapons "are
more costly than offensive weapons."'"
But the reluctance for further unilateral cuts in defense
spending may not be shared by all KOGB members or members of the
Supreme Soviet as a whole. Mikhail P. Simonov, Sukhoi aircraft
chief and chairman of the KOGB subcommittee on defense industry,
has stated that while the 1990 defense budget is "perfectly
sufficient for our country... we can and should take the path of a
further cutback in our military spending." He gave little
indication that further cuts could only result if the west did
likewise. Simonov was critical of past defense spending saying, "we
have not always spent the money allocated for defense needs,... in
a proprietary economical and careful fashion." Simonov believed
that reduced military spending would "force the defense industry
and Defense Ministry to adopt a more thoughtful attitude towards
resources allocated to them."
8S Ibid.
pa
'Yazov, Others on U.S. Ties, Military Budget," Communist of
the Armed Forces, No. I, January 1990.
or
Ibid., p. ? (See also George C. Weickhardt, "Recent
Discussion Of Defense Economics," and John Tedstrom, "Military
Opposition to Cuts in Defense Expenditure," Report en the USSR.
March 16, 1990, pp. 3-5.
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Simonov also evidently did not buy Shabanov's argument
that production of "qualitatively new arms" would be necessarily
more expensive. On the contrary, he said that the Soviets "could
organize production to make spending on arms manufacturing even
lower." According to Simonov, this could be accomplished, for
example, by reducing the "serial production" of military aircraft.
By cutting back on the production of "current models of combat
equipment," more money would be saved that could be allocated
towards developing "new types of arms."
Committee members Lt. Col. Viktor S. Podziruk and Senior
Lt . Nikolai D. Tutov have also pointed to areas of the budget that
can be reduced. Podziruk has called attention to non-combat
formations in the military that could be reduced such as mid-level
chains of command, political organs in the military, and sporting
companies. Podziruk has also been very critical of the privileges
accorded the military leadership. Tutov has pointed out the waste
in defense industry where several design bureaus work on a single
type of military equipment."
The KOGB ' s first attempt at budget oversight on the
surface appears to have gone relatively smoothly (considering this
was new business for the KOGB and despite Krasnaya Zvezda's account
of "varied opinions" and Ryzhkov's statements regarding KOGB budget
discussions"). But there is some question as to just how much
01
^ Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 1, January 1990.
Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 1, January 1990.
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oversight the committee performed given its unf ami 1 iarity with the
subject and the amount of time it had to review the budget. The
committee was probably presented with a draft budget drawn up by
the Ministry of Defense that already contained most of the budget
cuts that were eventually approved. Where the committee does appear
to have taken the initiative however, is in the areas of R & D
funding, increasing officer's pay, and the amount of money
allocated for military "social issues." This may have involved a
compromise between these three issues where the money saved from
reducing the former was transferred to the latter two. There are
some underlying problems that, while possibly resulting from the
experience of being at the bottom of the learning curve, the KOGB
will have to overcome if it is to function properly in the future.
Criticism of defense spending figures provided by the Defense
Ministry and the fact that a committee member would comment that
the committee still does not know just how much the Soviets are
spending on defense underscore the seriousness of the problem of
access to the "correct" numbers. Also it appears that some members
of the committee and the high command are attempting to take the
high ground regarding any further defense cuts. As the Soviet
economy continues to decline (it is expected to get worse before it
gets better) or at the very least remains at its present comatose
state, there are likely to be increasing calls for further cuts in
defense spending. Mounting consumer frustration will also add to
the pressure. In addition, as Lapygin's comments indicate,
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increased calls for further defense reductions are likely as the
West cuts back its spending.
C. THE KOGB AND MILITARY REFORM
Another issue that the KOGB is grappling with could have
profound impact on the Soviet military and is likely to cause
considerable controversy within the KOGB and the Supreme Soviet.
This is the issue of military reform, which is already causing
fit
divisions in the Soviet military. The question of military reform
can be seen as a natural result of glasnost, perestroika, and
demokratizatsia in Soviet society and in the military. While
civilian critics of the military have often called for reform, the
most active proponents of reform come from the ranks of the officer
corps
.
1. The Military Reformers
The "young turks" pressing for radical reform of the
Soviet military are 17 uniformed deputies in the Congress of
Q f
People's Deputies." The military deputies, including two members
of the KOGB (Lt. Col. Vikyor Podziruk and Senior Lt. Nikolai
Tutov), after forming a commission on military reform, presented a
94 see p. 47.
For a discussion of this topic, see Stephen Foye, "Radical
Military Reform and v The Young Turks'," Report on the USSR, April
13, 1990, pp. 8-10, and "Military Debates of the 1920's and
Contemporary Defense Policies," Report on the USSR, April 6, 1990,
pp. 9-13.
Stephen Foye, "Radical Military Reform and "The Young
Turks'," Report on the USSR, April 13, 1990, ?. 8.
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draft of their plan to the second session of the Supreme Soviet.
"The Draft Conceptualization of Military Reform" contains several
proposals anathema to the Soviet high command. The central idea of
the reform proposal is the "professionalism by stages" of the
Q7Soviet Armed Forces.' The professional army would be staffed by
volunteers with a reserve system built around territorial
formations. According to the professionalism by stages"
concept, the transition to a professional army would begin with the
Strategic Rocket Forces and eventually be applied to the other
00
services of the Armed Forces.
The draft military reform would "guarantee the control of
the military department by the highest state body and society as a
whole. The supervision of defense policy would be firmly
planted in the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet,
and the government.*"*
Several proposals are also suggested for keeping military
spending within the bounds of "reasonable sufficiency." These
include: significant reductions in troop strength and numbers of
97 m Supreme Soviet Defense Committee Meets," FBIS-SOV-90-C68
,
9 April 1990, p. 27.
For a discussion of the debate surrounding territorial
military formations, see Scott R. McMichael , "Soviet National
Military Formations, 1918-1938," Report on the USSR, April 20,
1990, pp. 3-7.
9? Stephen Foye, "Radical Military Reform and "The Young
Turks' , " p. 8
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military educational institutions; revamping the military training
system to make it more cost-effective; changes in the
administrative system; the increased use of civilian specialists;
unification of military and civilian industries; and the
elimination of privileges for the military leadership.
The draft military reform also envisions major changes in
] no
the role of the political organs in the Soviet military. The
Communist Party would no longer directly determine Soviet defense
policies. Communist influence would be exerted through Communist
officers. The number and status of the political officers would be
lessened. Eventually, the political officers would be elected and
their work would primarily center around morale and welfare of the
i oitroops . '
"The Draft Conceptualization of Military Reform" picked
up some key support when it was approved by the KOGB subcommittee
on armed forces headed by Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov.* Vv The
next step would be for the draft to pass the full KOGB which is




'^ For a summary of the debate surrounding the political
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2. The High Command and Military Reform
To say that the high command was cool to the ideas
expressed in the draft military reform passed by the KOGB armed
services subcommittee would certainly be an understatement. The
high command has long come out against the "prof essional ization" of
the Armed Forces, with Yazov, Moiseev, and Akhromeyev all speaking
out against the proposal, mainly on the grounds that it is too
expensive and, as a "mercenary" army, ideologically
1 *
*
unacceptable.*"" Evidently demonstrating displeasure at the entire
idea of an independent examination of the prospects of military
reform, the Ministry of Defense took no part in drafting the
proposed reforms though it was provided a draft to review. Not
surprisingly, the ministry reportedly came out against publication
of the draft.* A Soviet source commented that The Ministry of
Defense "practically did not take part" in the subcommittee hearing
that passed the draft reform proposals, saying, "Somehow they have
not shown interest in that work." Indicating that the Ministry of
Defense may have begun to take actions against those officers
involved in the military reform effort, it also reported that some
of the military officers who had participated in the reform
commissions work "have begun to experience certain troubles."
Reform commission member Lt . Col. Tsalkov reported "pressure" for
expressing views that "differ from the views of the leadership of
*'"" See "The Defense Minister Before the Supreme Soviet," p
28





the Ministry of Defense." The source also stated that the ministry
sought to address "the question in a rather drastic way" by calling
for the "dismissal from the ranks of the Armed Forces" of those who
have taken part in the commission's work.* 08 The Communist Party
has also taken action against reformist officers. KOGB member Tutov
was expelled from the party in February 1990 and Major Vladimir
Lopatin, head of the military reform commission, was expelled in
TV • 1 109April . '
While the high command is not completely adverse to the
idea of military reform, it almost certainly wants to restrict the
effort to within the purview of the Ministry of Defense. From the
high command's viewpoint, they are probably "satisfied" with the
degree of military reform already resulting from glasncst
,
perestroika, and demokratizatsia . As they see it, they have enough
on their hands without adopting a radical reform of the entire
Soviet defense establishment. The high command is taking its turn
at military reform through the drafting of a "Law on Defense." This
draft law will reportedly be presented at the fourth session of the
Supreme Soviet."" According to TASS , the draft law covers all
1 1 1
spheres of defense activity."* Being a product of the Collegium
- Ki
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"
Report on the USSR, May II, 1990, p. 29.
" c This will reportedly be the fourth draft of the law on
defense prepared by the General Staff. The three previous drafts
were evidently unsatisfactory and returned by the committee for
further work. (Report of the Committee on Armed Services, p. 9.)
" : Radio Liberty Daily Report, April 30, 1990.
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of the Defense Ministry, the draft is likely to be conservative in
its thinking.
The issue of the pace of military reform has already
caused some division within the committee. The House Armed Services
Committee report on the KOGB notes the "clear cleavage along
generational lines" that exists within the committee on the issue
of military reform, with older members more cautious and receptive
to the undertaking of "detailed analysis" of issues despite the
delay this may cause in addressing issues. Younger members are
"more eager to get on with the work of reform, perhaps even
preferring to choose any issue as a starting point, rather than do
nothing at all while the process of study and review went on."
Nonetheless, with the subcommittee on Armed Forces
already giving its approval to the draft military reform, the issue
is due to be brought before the KOGB before being presented to the
Supreme Soviet. Given the makeup of the committee, the draft is
likely to be watered down considerably. But as Foye points out, the
issue is nonetheless likely to receive a "wider airing" in future
Supreme Soviet sessions.* Given the past voting record of the
Supreme Soviet on military issues, the high command would be
justified in being somewhat apprehensive.
1 1
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A. THE KOGB: A QUESTION OF MEETING POTENTIAL
The policies of glasnost and perestroika have widened the
playing field upon which Soviet defense policy formation takes
place. The election of new, more democratic Supreme Soviet and its
KOGB have the potential for playing an increasingly important role
in the formation of Soviet defense policy. These new players are
engaged in a struggle with the traditional determiners of defense
policy over just how much, if any, influence they will yield. The
outcome of this contest will have a large impact upon whether the
USSR is able to develop a more balanced system of government after
70 years of highly-centralized, one-party rule.
If the Supreme Soviet is to play an increased role in the
formation of Soviet defense policy it would seem that the main
avenue for enacting reform would be through the KOGB. The House
Armed Services Committee report on the KOGB notes the committee's
"potential to be a major player in the national security policy
process of the Soviet Union. ""* While this potential certainly
exists, there are problems facing the committee that, failing
solution, remain obstacles to its reaching its full potential.
These problems are both structural, in the way the committee is set
up and how it operates, and bureaucratic, stemming from the fact
that the committee is a new creature attempting to formulate policy
1 1 ^
**• Report on the Committee on Armed Services, p. I
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in a hitherto closed exclusive environment. But resolution of these
problems will not be possible in the unstable political climate
that exists in the USSR today. Therefore, the survival of the KOGB
and its parent body are dependent upon the development of continued
political reform in the Soviet Union.
1. Structural Problems
Structurally, the committee is hindered by the fact that
members have retained their regular occupations and are not full
time legislators and thus unable to devote their full attention to
the committee's business. This could also cause, as the debate over
the committee's composition in the Supreme Soviet demonstrated,
considerable conflict of interest problems within the KOGB given
the high percentage of members involved in defense sector work.
While some committee members acknowledge that this preponderance of
"experts" is essential at this early point in the KOGB ' s life, they
likewise recognize the potential conflict but some have so far
attempted to play it down.* Yet it appears to have already
manifested itself on at least one occasion. The House Armed
Services Committee report notes that during Defense Minister
Yazov's appearance before the committee at which he presented the
defense budget, committee member Marshal Akhromeyev sat beside
Yazov rather than with his fellow committee members. The issue
of conflict of interest could pose considerable problems for
committee military officers forced to choose between their service
1 1 c





on the KOGB and the furtherance, or as the experience of the
1 1
7
military reformers would indicate, hinderance, of their careers.*
This potential conflict of interest may also arise among committee
i i o
members with ties to defense industries.**
Another factor impacting on the day to day workings of
the KOGB is the minimum amount of staff support available.
Presently the committee is limited to seven staff members. The
subcommittees have no staff and committee members have no
individual or legislative staff to draw upon.** Sturua, in
Mirovaya Ekcnomika , has contrasted this with the "large number of
excellent specialists" available to the ministries bringing issues
before the committee and has noted the KOGB ' s need for "quite a
large group of associates- tens of people" to provide staff
assistance.* This is particularly important for providing the
committee with alternative analyses of issues.
2. Bureaucratic Problems
As was pointed out earlier, being a new participant in
the formation of Soviet defense policy, the KOGB is attempting to
1 y 7
** The wisdom of allowing active duty military officers to run
for political office has certainly been brought home in the
division that has arisen in the Soviet officers corps. For a
discussion of this, see Stephen Foye, "Rumblings in the Soviet
Armed Forces," Report on the USSR, March 16, 1990. pp. 1-3.
** S Mikhail Tsypkin points out that this conflict of interest
is inevitable. See "The Committee for Defense and State Security of
the USSR Supreme Soviet," p. 10.
** Report of the Committee on Armed Services, p. 7.
**'* Mircvaya Ekonomika
, p. 84. Sturua also calls attention to
the inadequacy of the committee's computer support.
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exert influence in a previously exclusive environment. The amount
of influence it will be able to yield is directly dependent upon
the accuracy of the information it is privy to. And in no greater
realm have the traditional players in Soviet defense policy
formation had greater predominance than in the realm of
information.
While some committee members have told of not actually
being denied access to any information requested, they have spoken
of the reluctance of the Minister of Defense regarding the amount
of detail he should make available to the committee. It seems
that while information is being provided to the committee, it does
not contain sufficient details to enable the KOGB to perform its
own analysis and reach its own conclusions. And as one member's
comments regarding the figures presented for the defense budget
indicate, there is some question of the degree of accuracy of the
information provided. The lack of sufficient staff also leads
the committee to rely, perhaps too heavily, upon information
provided by the very ministries the KOGB is supposed to oversee and
could limit its access to independent analyses.
All of these issues have combined to place the committee
in a situation where its capabilities are not nearly up to its
tasks. A situation that could take a considerable amount of time to
overcome. Marshal Akhromeyev has spoken of the committee
difficulties at this early stage saying that it was necessary for
Report of the Committee on Armed Services, p. 13
1 11 See pp. 41-42 above
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KOGB members to first be "trained" for their new responsibilities.
Akhromeyev believed this "training" would take "at least several
months." Chairman Lapygin seems to think the process could take
even longer, believing that "organizational issues" within the KOGB
(and Congress of People's Deputies and, presumably, the Supreme
154Soviet) could take five years.
The committee has also yet to determine its relationship
vis-a-vis other Soviet governmental bodies. This has become
increasingly difficult as Gorbachev has repeatedly modified and/or
changed Union government structures. This continued government
reshuffling is not only a major factor in the ongoing Soviet
political crisis, it also makes it impossible for these structures
to delineate their individual responsibilities and exercise their
respective duties. For example, what role does the KOGB play if, as
it seems increasingly likely, the armed forces are used to quell
nationalist/ethnic unrest? Does use of the armed forces in this
manner come under the purview of the executive through the Ministry
of Internal Affairs, or is it a matter for the KOGB? If past events
are any indicator, it appears the KOGB plays at best a very limited
role in this scenario. On April 9 1989, Soviet troops were used to
break up peaceful demonstration in Tblisi, Georgia, killing 19
people. While the incident was brought before the Supreme Soviet
and the military commander of the area was subjected to
1 9 %
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questioning, the KOGB evidently did not see fit to conduct an
investigation of its own.
So as of yet, the committee has not found its voice and
the amount of influence it will actually yield vis-a-vis the
government and Supreme Soviet remains to be seen. Georgi Arbatov,
speaking before the Congress of People's Deputies noted that the
committee "has been staffed strangely and works strangely."**"
Summing up criticism of the KOGB to date, Major General Yuri
Kirshin writes in New Times, ". . .the committee has not yet attained
a standard of professionalism which would allow it to contribute
substantially to defense policy making."
B. PROSPECTS FOR THE KOGB AND MILITARY REFORM
In his study of the KOGB in World Economy , Sturua points out
three areas where the KOGB must be "comparable" to other
parliamentary bodies of the world if it is to be successful. These
are: the degree of access to information enjoyed by the executive
power, the level of detail in which the defense budget is examined,
and the quality of independent analytical material. The
discussion above highlighted some of the problems the KOGB has had
in these areas to date. The parliamentary body that the KOGB most
"Congress Debates Economic Policy-Ill" The Current Digest
of the Soviet Press, v. XLII, February 14, 1990, p. 23.
Yuri Kirshin, "Why Military Reform is Needed," New Times,
March 20-29, 1990, p. 30.
* World Economy and International Relations , No. 1, January
1990, p. 84.
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aspires to emulate is the U.S. House of Representatives Armed
Services Committee. Indeed, according to House Armed Services
Committee Chairman Les Aspin, the two committees have "embarked on
an active exchange of information, both on defense issues and on
legislative procedures and practices." The committees have also
hosted exchange visits. Members of the Armed Services visited the
Soviet Union in August 1989, while KOGB members visited the U.S. in
February 1990. More such exchanges are likely and tentatively
planned
.
But as the Armed Services Committee report rightly points out,
"it is crucial not to think of the Supreme Soviet in American
terms, i.e., to mirror-image."*" This is also true when studying
the KOGB. In his joint interview with Congressman Aspin, Lapygin
made this same point saying, "We are ready to consider the
experience of the American legislators, but we, of course, are not
going to copy their ways."""
The report also makes the point (in its discussion of why it
is unlikely that the KOGB will propose drastic reductions in
defense spending) that "policy confrontations, which are
commonplace in the U.S., run counter to the Soviet emphasis on
collegial, consensus decisions."* 3 * The theme of the KOGB arriving
at decisions through consensus is repeated several times in the
i is
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Armed Services Committee report though, as examination of the
committee's handling of the issues of budget and military reform
would indicate, there appear to be divisions in the committee that
could make arriving at a consensus (at least on these issues) more
wishful thinking than reality.* - " If anything, these apparent
divisions within the committee could lead to deadlock between the
reformers and the conservatives over several issues. The first
indication of this happening may be when the KOGB takes up the
radical draft military reform program passed by the armed services
subcommittee. If the committee, as it is currently comprised,*""
does indeed find itself deadlocked on major issues, it chances of
becoming an important player in determining Soviet defense policy
will diminish.
This is not to downplay the likelihood of major military
reforms emerging from the Supreme Soviet or the significance of the
establishment of a defense oversight committee within the Supreme
Soviet. On the contrary, given the increasing dire straights of the
Soviet economy, the perceived reduced threat from the West and the
*"* Stephen Foye makes a similar point in "US Congressional
Report on Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security," Report
on" the USSR, May II, 1990, p. 7. Foye also points out that "While
the Congressional report is an important document and provides a
number of key insights into the workings of the fledgling Committee
for Defense and State Security, the reliance of the American
authors solely on the testimony of those ten Soviet committee
members who visited the United States in February produced an
incomplete portrait of the committee's operations and personnel."
* 3
" One fifth of the members of the Supreme Soviet are supposed
to be changed every year. This could also be expected to have an
impact on the composition of the KOGB. However, the mechanism by
which this rotation is to take place has not been established at
the time of this writing.
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certainty of reduced Western defense spending, further military
reforms are almost a certainty. And the establishment of the KOGB
is certainly a key element in the ongoing political reform process.
The point here is that the drive for military reform is more likely
to come from the Supreme Soviet as a whole and probably not from
the KOGB given its current composition and problems. As the debate
over the confirmation of the Defense Minister and the vote on the
early release of students has shown, the Supreme Soviet has
demonstrated a willingness to rebuff the high command. Also, the
Supreme Soviet's skepticism about the impartiality of the KOGB will
cause it to look at the committee's work with a very critical eye.
But the ultimate success of the Supreme Soviet and its
Committee for Defense and State Security is dependent upon the
success of continued political reform in the Soviet Union,
resulting in stable governmental structures that are able to
exercise real power. Unfortunately, political developments have
been heading in just the opposite direction. Should the political
climate in the USSR fail to progress further and leave the country
with a powerless, fragile central government or slip back to
increased Stalinist centralization, attempts by the two bodies to
overcome their myriad difficulties will become moot. As Mikhail
Tsypkin points out:
"The direction of Soviet political development will determine
whether the committee will be able to grow eventually into a
watchdog of the national security establishment or whether it
will become a mere footnote to a history of failed reform"""
*-" Tsypkin, "The Committee for Defense and State Security of
the USSR Supreme Soviet," p. 11.
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APPENDIX: THE COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE AND STATE SECURITY
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
Chairman Vladimir L. Lapygin (chief designer and director,
Moscow automation plant)
Deputy Chairman Col. Valeriy Ochirov (student, Voroshilov
General Staff Academy)
Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev (military adviser to President
Gorbachev)
Veniamin Beluyev, Chairman, subcommittee on state security
(chairman, Byelorussian Republic KGB)
Oleg S. Belyakov (Chief, Defense Department, Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)
Vitaliy A. Biryukov, Secretary of the KOGB
Keshrim Boztayev (First Secretary, Semipaltinsk Obkom)
Nikolai Britvin (chief, KGB Border Guards Political
Directorate)
Vasiliy Bykov (secretary, USSR Writer's Union)
Anatoliy A. Chizhov (director, "Progress" aerospace plant)
Andrei Gaponov-Grekhov (director, Academy of Sciences Applied
Physics Institute)
Stanislav Golovin (radio apparatus tuner, machine-building
plant
)
Ivan Gorelovskiy (chairman, Azerbaijan Republic KGB)
Yuroy Isayev (director, production association)
Admiral Vitaliy Ivanov (Commander, Baltic Fleet)
Gregoriy Kharchenko (First Secretary, Zaporozhye Obkom)
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Arnold Klautsen (First Secretary, Riga Gorkom)
Aleksei Kolbeshkin (team leader, production association)
Nikolai Kucherskiy (director, mining and metallurgy combine)
Mechis Laurinkus (scientist, Philosophy Institute, Lithuania)
Vladimir Lukin (cutter, diesel engine building plant)
Yevgeniy Nemstev (team leader, production association)
Rudolf Nikitin (director, production association)
GenrikhV. Novoshilov (director and general designer, Ilyushin
aircraft design bureau)
Vladimir A. Opolinskiy (foreman, shipyard)
Lt. Col. Viktor Podziruk (instructor, military unit)
Valeriy Ryumin (deputy chief designer, production association)
Yuriy Samsanov (First Secretary, Ulyanovsk Obkom)
Army General Vitaliy Shabanov (Deputy Minister of Defense)
Leonid Sharin (First Secretary, Amur Obkom)
Yuriy Sharipov (director, production association)
Mikhail Simonov , chairman subcommittee on defense industry
(director, Sukhoi aircraft)
Igor D. Spasskiy (chief designer and director, marine
technology bureau)
Petr Talanchuk (Rector, Kiev Pol ytechnical Institute)
Sergei A. Tsyplyayev, secretary of KOGB (secretary, state
optical institute)
Senior Lt . Nikolai Tutov (Co-chairman, Socialist Democratic
Association)
Vladimir Tuzov (chairman, Radio and Electronics Workers Union)
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Vladimir Utkin (director, production association)
Velio Vare (staffer, Estonian Academy of Scientific History
Institute)
Yevgeniy Velikhov, chairman, subcommittee on armed forces
(Vice President, Academy of Sciences; Director Atomic Energy
Institute)
Arkadiy Volskiy (Central Committee official)
Anatoliy Yefimov (Second Secretary, Communist Party,
Uzbekistan)
Munavarkhon Zokirov (chief, a DOSAFF sports club)
* Source: "The New Soviet Legislature: Committee on Defense and
State Security," Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of
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